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Constitutional Issues Posed in 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 
by 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
The stated purpose of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”)1 is to “improve bankruptcy law and 
practice by restoring personal responsibility and 
integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that 
the system is fair for both debtors and 
creditors.”2  Its legislative history stretches 
over almost a decade, but each iteration of it 
continued the same core features, the most 
predominant of which is a complex “means test” to 
determine whether a debtor may file a Chapter 7 
case.3 
This Article seeks to identify the 
constitutional issues most likely raised by 
BAPCPA.  It cannot identify all that might 
possibly arise, as experience with the law will 
generate many questions that I cannot presently 
anticipate.  Nor does it attempt to provide 
 
*Erwin Chemerinsky is the Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke 
University School of Law.  The author thanks Kimberly Kisabeth for 
her excellent research assistance. 
1S. 256, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
2H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005). 
3Failure to satisfy the means test is presumptive abuse of Chapter 
7, and the disqualified debtor either must file for reorganization 
under Chapter 11 or 13 or refrain from filing. 
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definitive answers to the constitutional questions 
it raises.  Instead, the objective is to identify 
for judges and practitioners the constitutional 
questions they are likely to see, summarize the 
applicable constitutional law, and anticipate the 
arguments that will be made. 
Specifically, this Article focuses on the 
following constitutional questions that might 
arise under BAPCPA: Do BAPCPA’s requirements for 
the content of attorney advertising violate the 
First Amendment?  Does its regulation of the 
advice attorneys may give their debtor clients 
violate the First Amendment?  Does its regulation 
of attorney conduct violate the Tenth Amendment or 
separation of powers?  Would an involuntary 
Chapter 11 case that required payments over a 
five-year period constitute impermissible peonage?  
Does the means test violate the uniformity 
requirement or equal protection?  Do the debtor 
disclosure requirements violate the right to 
privacy?  Do the limits imposed on certain 
judicial actions violate separation of powers? 
 
I.  DO REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEYS’ 
ADVERTISEMENTS VIOLATE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT? 
BAPCPA requires consumer bankruptcy lawyers to 
identify themselves in advertisements as “debt 
relief agencies” and to state: “We help people 
file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy 
Code.”4  This content-based regulation of speech 
raises First Amendment issues. 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S PERSPECTIVE ON ATTORNEY 
ADVERTISING 
“Constitutional protection for attorney 
 
411. U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) & (b)(2)(B); see infra text accompanying 
notes 42-46. 
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advertising, and for commercial speech generally, 
is of recent vintage.”5  In Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, the Arizona Bar had disciplined two 
attorneys for advertising their legal clinic in a 
local newspaper in violation of the Arizona Bar’s 
blanket rule prohibiting attorney advertisements.6  
The Supreme Court ruled that the disciplinary rule 
violated the First Amendment.7 
Although the Court acknowledged that “[t]he 
interest of the States in regulating lawyers is 
especially great since lawyers are essential to 
the primary governmental function of administering 
justice, and have historically been ‘officers of 
the courts,’”8 the Court demanded additional 
justification for the regulation, and eventually 
struck the ban on price advertising for what it 
deemed “routine” legal services: “the uncontested 
divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested 
personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the 
like.”9  “Expressing confidence that legal 
advertising would only be practicable for such 
simple, standardized services, the Court rejected 
the State’s proffered justifications for 
regulation.”10  Although the Court acknowledged 
 
5Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995). 
6Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 356 (1977). 
7Id. at 382.  The Court stated that its conclusion was consistent 
with Virginia Pharmacy in that the disciplinary rule at hand also 
served to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and promote 
public ignorance.  Id. at 365, citing Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(holding that the First Amendment protected from state regulation the 
right of pharmacists to engage in “commercial speech” by advertising 
prescription drug prices); see also In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191 (1982); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985). 
8Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62, quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 
421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). 
9Id. at 372. 
10Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623.  In Bates, the Supreme Court 
applied the three-prong test and stated that it was not persuaded by 
any of the state’s proffered justifications for its restriction of 
price advertising by attorneys, including: (1) the adverse effect on 
professionalism; (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney 
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that there could be reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place and manner of advertising,11 it held 
that advertising by attorneys could not be 
subjected to blanket suppression.  The Court noted 
that it was in the public interest to increase use 
of legal services, and viewed advertising as a 
legitimate vehicle to provide the public with 
information about the nature and cost of such 
services.12 
Nearly two decades of cases built upon the Bates 
opinion have firmly established lawyer advertising 
as commercial speech entitled to First Amendment 
protection.13 
The level of scrutiny with which the Court will 
evaluate any state restriction on attorney 
advertising against First Amendment protections 
depends on the nature or effect of the 
restriction.  State restrictions that result in 
less than a complete prohibition of attorneys’ 
non-misleading advertising14 must serve a 
substantial state interest to avoid running afoul 
of the First Amendment.15  Disclosure requirements 
imposed by the state on attorney advertising must 
be reasonably related to the state’s interest in 
preventing consumer deception. 
 
advertising; (3) the adverse effect on the administration of justice; 
(4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising; (5) the adverse 
effect of advertising on the quality of service; and (6) the 
difficulties of enforcement absent wholesale restriction.  Bates, 433 
U.S. at 368-79. 
11Id. at 384. 
12Id. at 376.  See Daniel Callender, Attorney Advertising and the 
Use of Dramatization in Television Advertisements, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 
(Special Section) 89, 97 (2001). 
13See, e.g., Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623; Shapero v. Kentucky Bar 
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637; In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199 (1982). 
14Regulation of misleading advertising is discussed below, infra 
text accompanying notes 16-18. 
15Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (“Advertising that is false, deceptive, or 
misleading of course is subject to restraint.  Since the advertiser 
knows his product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, 
we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will 
discourage protected speech.”) (citation omitted). 
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The Court noted in Bates that its holding—that 
advertising by attorneys is commercial speech 
protected by the First Amendment and may not be 
subjected to blanket suppression—did not foreclose 
regulation of advertising that was false, 
deceptive, or misleading.16  The majority did not 
believe regulation to assure truthfulness would 
discourage protected speech, and any concern 
regarding potential inhibition of spontaneity 
seemed inapplicable because commercial speech was 
generally of a calculated nature.  In this 
context, the Court held misstatements that might 
be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other 
advertising might be especially harmful given the 
public’s lack of sophistication regarding legal 
services.17  Claims as to the quality of services 
are also not easily subject to measurement or 
verification, and therefore more likely to be so 
misleading as to warrant restriction.18 
The Supreme Court stated in In re R.M.J. that 
Bates and subsequent cases made it clear that the 
imposition of appropriate restrictions on attorney 
advertising is permissible when the particular 
advertising in question is inherently likely to 
deceive or where the record indicated that a 
particular form or method of advertising had in 
fact been deceptive.19  Furthermore, false and 
deceptive advertising could be prohibited 
entirely.20  However, states may not place an 
 
16Id. at 372. 
17Id. at 375. 
18Id. at 384. 
19455 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1982). 
20“Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to 
the protections of the First Amendment.  But when the particular 
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently 
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such 
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate 
restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.  But 
the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of 
potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of 
practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is 
not deceptive.”  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (citing 
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absolute prohibition on certain types of 
potentially misleading information in attorney 
advertisements—such as the listing of an 
attorney’s area of practice—if such information 
also may be presented in a way that is not 
deceptive.  Any restriction on such information 
only may be as broad as reasonably necessary to 
prevent deception.21 
Government regulation of non-misleading attorney 
advertising is analyzed under the commercial 
speech framework set forth by Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission 
of New York.22  In Central Hudson, the Court held 
that government may freely regulate commercial 
speech that is misleading or concerns unlawful 
activity.23  Commercial speech outside of those two 
categories may be regulated if: (1) a substantial 
government interest exists in support of 
regulation;24 (2) the restriction directly and 
materially advances that interest; and (3) the 
restriction is “narrowly drawn.”25 
 
Bates, 433 U.S. at 375).  See also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
21R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
22447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
23Id. at 563-64. 
24With respect to attorneys’ advertisements, the intermediate 
standard of review for analyzing commercial speech restrictions under 
the free speech guarantee of the Constitution’s First Amendment does 
not permit the reviewing court to supplant the precise interests put 
forward by a state with other suppositions; however, one substantial 
state interest is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the 
intermediate standard’s three-prong test. Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995); see also Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (deeming only one of the 
government’s proffered interests “substantial”). 
25See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (holding that in order for a state to 
regulate non-misleading attorney advertising, the state must assert a 
substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in 
proportion to the interest served).  The Court also noted that 
“[a]lthough the potential for deception and confusion is particularly 
strong in the context of advertising professional services, 
restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably 
necessary to prevent the deception.” Id.  See also Zauderer, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985) (indicating that attorney advertising was covered by the 
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In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Supreme Court, the Court rejected an attorney’s 
contention that state disciplinary rules imposing 
certain disclosure requirements on attorney 
advertising must do so by the least restrictive 
means in order to conform with the First 
Amendment.26  The Court held an attorney’s rights 
as an advertiser are adequately protected as long 
as disclosure requirements are reasonably related 
to the state’s interest in preventing the 
deception of consumers.27  Since the extension of 
First Amendment protection to commercial speech 
was justified principally by the value of the 
information provided to consumers by such speech, 
attorneys have a minimal interest in providing 
information that is not factual in nature.28  The 
opinion emphasized, however, that unjustified or 
unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might 
offend the First Amendment by chilling protected 
commercial speech.29 
State laws and rules restricting attorney 
advertisements concerning subject matter areas of 
legal practice have been held to violate the First 
Amendment.  In In re R.M.J.,30 the Supreme Court 
held that a state’s disciplinary rule that limited 
the includible areas of practice to one or more of 
a list of twenty-three and provided no flexibility 
in phrasing such practice areas was an invalid 
restriction upon speech.  The advertisement in 
question appeared in a newspaper and telephone 
 
doctrine that commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and 
does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted only in the 
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through 
means that directly advance that interest); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar 
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (observing that state regulation of lawyer 
advertising may extend only as far as the interest such regulation 
serves). 
26Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29Id. at 673. 
30455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
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directory and (1) listed areas of practice using 
different phraseology than specified by the rule, 
and (2) advertised for services in several areas 
of law for which there was no analogous term in 
the rule’s list.31  The Court stated its conclusion 
was also based on the fact that (1) the listing 
published by the attorney had not been shown to be 
misleading, and (2) the committee of the state’s 
highest court responsible for prosecuting attorney 
disciplinary proceedings had suggested no 
substantial state interest served by the rule’s 
restriction.32 
Similarly, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, the Court ruled that advertisements 
presenting truthful, non-deceptive information and 
advice regarding a potential client’s legal rights 
were neither misleading nor deceptive.33  In 
Zauderer, an Ohio attorney advertised legal 
services for women injured by the Dalkon Shield 
Intrauterine Device.34  The Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel charged him with violating rules that 
prohibited self-recommendation and the acceptance 
of employment based on unsolicited legal advice. 
The Court held that the advertisement was not 
false or deceptive because the attorney never 
promised litigation would be successful or that he 
had any special expertise in handling lawsuits 
involving the Dalkon Shield, and it could not be 
prohibited on that basis.35  The Court then applied 
the Central Hudson test and rejected the proffered 
state interests as insufficient to support the 
regulation.36 
 
31The attorney advertised using the terms “personal injury” and 
“real estate” instead of “tort law” and “property law,” respectively, 
and listed unanalogous areas such as “contract,” “zoning & land use,” 
“communication,” and “pension & profit sharing plans.”  Id. at 205. 
32Id. 
33471 U.S. 626, 639 (1985). 
34Id. at 630-31. 
35Id. at 640-41. 
36Id. at 642 (“[A]lthough some sensitive souls may have found the 
appellant’s advertisement in poor taste, it can hardly be said to 
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In the context of commercial speech, the Court 
has also found the following state interests 
substantial: (1) conserving energy,37 (2) 
maintaining standards of licensed professionals,38 
(3) preventing solicitation that involves “fraud, 
undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and 
other forms of ‘vexatious conduct,’”39 (4) 
protecting the privacy and tranquility of the 
home,40 and (5) preserving the reputation of the 
legal profession.41 
B. BAPCPA’S REGULATION OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISING 
BAPCPA adds new Code42 §§ 526, 527 and 528 which 
proscribe and prescribe certain activities of some 
bankruptcy lawyers.  A lawyer who provides any 
bankruptcy assistance to an “assisted person” is 
defined to be a “debt relief agency.”43  While the 
principal target of this definition probably was 
 
have invaded the privacy of those who read it.”). 
37Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568. 
38Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978); 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995). 
39Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462. 
40Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625. 
41Id.  But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985) (noting that the state has a substantial interest in 
ensuring dignified behavior in the courtroom, but that the state’s 
interest in the protection of the dignity of the legal profession was 
not substantial enough to justify restricting free speech rights 
under the First Amendment). 
42Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the Bankruptcy Code (the 
“Code”) are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., as amended by BAPCPA. 
43Code § 101(12A), added by BAPCPA, defines a “debt relief agency” 
as “any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted 
person in return for the payment of money or other valuable 
consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer under section 
110,” subject to certain exclusions.  This definition could include 
attorneys, document preparers and for-profit credit counselors (§ 
501(c)(3) nonprofit entities being specifically excluded from the 
definition), but this Article will focus solely on BAPCPA’s 
application to attorneys.  For a more detailed analysis of BAPCPA’s 
regulation of debt relief agencies, see Henry J. Sommer, Trying to 
Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the 
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 206-11 (2005) (hereafter “Sommer”). 
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consumer debtor lawyers and petition preparers, 
the definition of “assisted person”44 is not 
limited to debtors or prospective debtors, so it 
could include creditors and landlords.  And 
although the debts of an “assisted person” must be 
primarily consumer debts, the bankruptcy 
assistance need not be provided with respect to 
the person’s debts.  Therefore an individual 
landlord, most of whose debts are consumer debts, 
could be an “assisted person” even when the 
bankruptcy advice pertains to the landlord’s 
rights in the bankruptcy case of a tenant.45 
New Code §§ 527 and 528 require certain 
disclosures and statements to be made by a “debt 
relief agency.”  Within three business days of 
first offering to provide bankruptcy advice to an 
“assisted person,” the debt relief agency must 
provide a clear and conspicuous written notice, 
some of which may be inaccurate and most of which 
would be irrelevant to a creditor client.46  New 
Code § 528 requires that within five days of first 
providing bankruptcy assistance services to an 
assisted person, a debt relief agency must execute 
 
44“The term ‘assisted person’ means any person whose debts consist 
primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property 
is less than $150,000.”  Code § 101(3). 
45Accord, Sommer, supra note 43, at 211. 
46The debt relief agency must provide the assisted person with the 
notice the clerk must provide upon filing a case pursuant to Code § 
342(b)(1), and a clear and conspicuous written notice that all 
information required to be provided by the assisted person during a 
bankruptcy case must be complete, accurate and truthful, that all 
assets and liabilities must be completely disclosed, that “the 
replacement value of each asset as defined in section 506 must be 
stated in those documents where requested after reasonable inquiry to 
establish such value,” that current monthly income and disposable 
income are required to be disclosed after reasonable inquiry, that 
information an assisted person provides during a case may be audited, 
and that failure to provide such information may result in dismissal 
of the case or criminal sanctions.  Code § 527(a)(2).  Code § 506 
does not require replacement value for any assets except collateral 
for secured debts in certain cases, replacement value may not be the 
basis for valuing exempt assets, and none of the required schedules 
and statements of affairs specifically requests replacement value.  
Accord, Sommer, supra note 43, at 210. 
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a written contract with the person that explains 
the services the agency will provide and the fees 
for such services.  It also requires that any 
advertisement of bankruptcy assistance services, 
or assistance with respect to credit defaults, 
mortgage foreclosures, evictions, or debt 
problems, include the following or substantially 
similar statement: “We are a debt relief agency.  
We help people file for bankruptcy relief under 
the Bankruptcy Code.” 
These statements and disclosures are required 
regardless of whether the debt relief agency in 
fact represents consumer debtors in bankruptcy 
cases.  They would seem to apply to a purely 
creditor’s lawyer if one or more of the lawyer’s 
clients has debts that are primarily consumer 
debts, even if the representation is not with 
respect to those debts but instead deals only with 
the creditor’s claims in a bankruptcy case. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN REGULATING THE CONTENT OF 
ADVERTISING 
Those objecting to these provisions are likely 
to argue that they violate the First Amendment 
because they are not “narrowly drawn”47 and, in 
fact, increase the likelihood of misleading 
 
47See In re R.M.J. 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (holding that in order 
for a state to regulate non-misleading attorney advertising, the 
state must assert a substantial interest and the interference with 
speech must be in proportion to the interest served).  The Court also 
noted that “[a]lthough the potential for deception and confusion is 
particularly strong in the context of advertising professional 
services, restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than 
reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.”  Id.  See also 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985) (indicating that attorney advertising was covered by the 
doctrine that commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and 
does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted only in the 
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through 
means that directly advance that interest); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar 
Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (observing that state regulation of lawyer 
advertising may extend only as far as the interest such regulation 
serves). 
793CHEMERINSKYFINAL 9/6/2005  1:57 PM 
112 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. XX 
speech.  Those challenging the regulation will 
argue that the new “debt-relief agency” provisions 
are so overinclusive that they will actually 
create more confusion among debtors seeking 
assistance.  Entities that represent creditors 
might be deemed debt-relief agencies under the 
broad language of the provisions. 
Moreover, the provisions of BAPCPA fail to 
distinguish between attorneys and non-attorneys 
providing bankruptcy services.48  Under current 
law, only attorneys are permitted to give legal 
advice, file pleadings, or represent debtors in 
bankruptcy hearings.  Also, unlike non-attorney 
bankruptcy petition preparers, only attorneys are 
licensed by the state in which they practice, 
bound by ethical requirements, and subject to 
discipline by the courts in which they practice.  
Further, only communications between the debtor 
and his attorney are protected by the attorney-
client privilege.  Therefore, the provisions are 
likely to confuse the public by requiring both 
attorneys and non-attorney bankruptcy petition 
preparers to advertise themselves as “debt relief 
agencies.” 
I believe that creditors’ lawyers will have a 
strong argument that their First Amendment rights 
are violated when they have to make the false 
statement, “We are a debt relief agency.  We help 
people file for bankruptcy.”  In light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in R.M.J., any compulsory 
disclosures are of questionable constitutionality, 
but especially when the government is requiring 
false statements.  However, this is a challenge 
that creditors’ lawyers will need to bring.  The 
Supreme Court has been clear that the overbreadth 
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech49 and 
 
48Under BAPCPA, any “person,” including both attorneys and 
“bankruptcy petition preparers,” who assists debtors with their 
bankruptcies in return for compensation, is deemed to be a “debt-
relief agency.” 
49Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipsides Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
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thus a debtor’s attorney cannot challenge the law 
on the ground that it is unconstitutional as 
applied to creditors’ lawyers. 
 
II.  DOES BAPCPA’S PROHIBITION OF  
ATTORNEYS’ ADVICE VIOLATE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT? 
A. BAPCPA’S PROHIBITIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVICE 
New Code § 526 imposes restrictions on the kind 
of advice such a “debt relief agency” can provide.  
Most of this prohibited advice would be 
inappropriate for other reasons, such as making 
misrepresentations,50 but one of them might be 
entirely appropriate: Code § 526(a)(4) forbids a 
debt relief agency to advise an assisted person or 
prospective assisted person to incur additional 
debt in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy 
relief or for the purpose of paying fees for 
services rendered by an attorney or petition 
preparer in connection with the bankruptcy case.51 
This prohibition is particularly troubling when 
it might be completely legal and even desirable 
for the client to incur such debt.  For example, 
there may be instances where it is advisable for a 
 
455 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1982) (overbreadth does not apply in commercial 
speech cases). 
50Code § 526(a)(1) prohibits a debt relief agency from failing to 
perform any service that it had informed the assisted person that it 
would provide in connection with a case or proceeding under Title 11.  
Section 526(a)(2) prohibits a debt relief agency from making any 
untrue or misleading statement, or advising any assisted person to 
make any such untrue or misleading statement.  Section 526(a)(3) 
prohibits a debt relief agency from misrepresenting to any assisted 
person the services that the agency will provide or the benefits and 
risks from being a debtor in a bankruptcy case. 
51Code § 526(a)(4) (a debt relief agency shall not “advise an 
assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person 
filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy 
petition preparer fee or charge for services performed as part of 
preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this title”). 
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client to obtain a mortgage, to refinance an 
existing mortgage to obtain a lower interest rate, 
or to buy a new car on time.  There would be no 
fraud in doing so if the client intended to pay 
such debt notwithstanding the filing of a 
contemplated bankruptcy case.  For example, the 
client may intend to keep all payments fully 
current and to reaffirm such debt once the case is 
filed. 
Moreover, most of an attorney’s fee for handling 
a Chapter 13 case is paid over time through the 
Chapter 13 plan.  But that means that at the time 
the case is filed, the client has incurred 
additional debt in contemplation of filing a 
bankruptcy case.  Indeed, such debt was 
specifically incurred for the purpose of paying 
the fees of the attorney filing the case. 
But § 526(a)(4) appears to prohibit any attorney 
from advising a client to incur any such debt, 
regardless of how appropriate or advisable.  The 
clause directly regulates the content of speech of 
lawyers to their clients, even when it is 
accurate, legal, and desirable.  In addition to 
First Amendment considerations on this issue, 
there are strong public policy considerations 
implicated when the government restricts the type 
of advice attorneys can give their clients. 
B. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF ATTORNEY SPEECH 
The Supreme Court has been very protective of 
the First Amendment rights of attorneys to advise 
and zealously represent their clients.52  Also, the 
Supreme Court has explained that a central 
principle of the First Amendment is that content-
based restrictions on speech must meet strict 
scrutiny, while content-neutral regulation only 
need meet intermediate scrutiny.  In Turner 
Broadcasting System v. FCC,53 Justice Kennedy, 
 
52Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001). 
53512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
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writing for the majority, noted that “[g]overnment 
action that stifles speech on account of its 
message, or that requires the utterance of a 
particular message favored by the Government, 
contravenes this essential [First Amendment] 
right.”54  Justice Kennedy explained, “For these 
reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to 
narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not 
countenance governmental control over the content 
of messages expressed by private individuals.”55 
I think that this is likely the strongest basis 
for a constitutional challenge to BAPCPA.  
Preventing lawyers from giving important, lawful 
information to their clients cannot be reconciled 
with the First Amendment.  However, the Court is 
likely to declare this provision unconstitutional 
as applied, rather than on its face.  In recent 
years, the Court has stressed its strong 
preference for as-applied challenges, rather than 
facial challenges, to the constitutionality of 
federal laws.56  The Court has said that a facial 
challenge requires demonstrating that all 
applications of the law would be 
unconstitutional.57  That is not likely with regard 
to these provisions of BAPCPA.  Instead, courts 
are likely to hold that it is unconstitutional to 
prohibit lawyers from giving truthful, lawful 
information to their clients, and that it is 
unconstitutional to require attorneys to put false 
information in their advertisements. 
III.  DOES FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
 
54Id. at 641. 
55Id. 
56Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948-49 
(2004). 
57United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (“A facial 
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult 
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid. . . .  [W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine 
outside the limited context of the First Amendment.”) (due process 
challenge to the Bail Reform Act). 
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ATTORNEYS VIOLATE THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
OR SEPARATION OF POWERS? 
A. THE STATES’ ROLE IN REGULATING ATTORNEYS 
The regulation of attorneys is an important 
governmental function in the administration of 
justice and the responsibility has historically 
been reserved to and performed by the states.58  
Throughout American history, the licensing and 
regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to 
the states.  The states prescribe the 
qualifications for admission to practice and the 
standards of professional conduct.59 
As summarized in Hoover v. Ronwin: 
[T]he regulation of the activities of 
the bar is at the core of the State’s 
power to protect the public. . . .  The 
interest of the States in regulating 
lawyers is especially great since 
lawyers are essential to the primary 
governmental function of administering 
justice, and have historically been 
“officers of the courts.” . . .  Few 
other professions are as close to the 
“core of the State’s power to protect 
the public.”  Nor is any trade or other 
profession as “essential to the primary 
governmental function of administering 
justice.”60 
 
58Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam) (“Since the 
founding of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has 
been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia 
within their respective jurisdictions.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, 
Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 829, 858 (2002) (noting that the states have traditionally 
exercised the power left to them in this area). 
59Leis, 439 U.S. at 442. 
60466 U.S. 555, 568 n.18 (1984), quoting Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
states’ interest in disciplining lawyers is 
“incident to their broader responsibility for 
keeping the administration of justice and the 
standards of professional conduct unsullied.”61  
The states’ interests implicated in BAPCPA are 
particularly strong.  In addition to its general 
interest in protecting consumers and regulating 
commercial transactions, the states bears a 
special responsibility for maintaining standards 
among members of the licensed professions. 
In addition, under the doctrine of separation of 
powers, the courts are afforded the inherent power 
to regulate admission to the practice of law by 
prescribing minimum levels of competency, to set 
standards for continuing legal practice, to 
oversee the conduct of attorneys as officers of 
the court, and to control and supervise the 
practice of law both in and out of court.62 
Therefore, the power to regulate the actual 
practice of law, including the power to discipline 
attorneys, appears to be among the inherent powers 
of the courts.63  In fact, every state in the 
United States recognizes that the power to admit 
and to discipline attorneys rests in the 
judiciary.64  “This is necessarily so.  An attorney 
is an officer of the court and whether a person 
shall be admitted [or disciplined] is a judicial, 
and not a legislative, question.”65 
In addition to its general interest in 
protecting consumers and regulating commercial 
transactions, states bear a special responsibility 
for maintaining standards among members of the 
 
421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975), and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 
(1973). 
61Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1961). 
62In re Attorney Discipline System, 19 Cal. 4th 582, 967 P.2d 49, 
54 (Cal. 1998). 
63Id. 
64Id. 
65Id. 
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licensed professions.66  The important difference 
between regulation of the legal profession and 
regulation of other professions is that admission 
to the bar is a judicial function, and members of 
the bar are officers of the court, subject to 
discipline by the court.  Hence, the states and 
the courts appear to share the power to regulate 
attorneys. 
B. BAPCPA PRESCRIBES PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF DEBT 
RELIEF AGENCY PROVISIONS 
BAPCPA imposes various penalties for violations 
of §§ 526, 527 or 528.  First, any contract 
between a debt relief agency and an assisted 
person that does not comply with these provisions 
is void and may not be enforced by any state or 
federal court or by any person, except an assisted 
person.67  Second, a debt relief agency is liable 
to an assisted person for any fees or charges paid 
by such person to the agency, plus actual damages 
and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, for any 
intentional or negligent failure to comply with §§ 
526, 527 and 528.68  Third, a state official may 
seek to enjoin violations of these provisions or 
to recover actual damages on behalf of assisted 
persons arising from such violations, including 
recovery of their fees, plus reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs.69  Fourth, the bankruptcy court, on 
its own motion or on motion of the U.S. Trustee or 
the debtor, may enjoin violations of these 
provisions or “impose an appropriate civil 
penalty” for intentional violations or a clear and 
consistent pattern of violations of these 
 
66See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. 
Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). 
67Code § 526(c)(1). 
68Code § 526(c)(2)(A). 
69Code § 526(c)(3).  The federal district courts are given 
concurrent jurisdiction over such state enforcement actions.  Code § 
526(c)(4). 
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provisions.70  Finally, these provisions do not 
preempt state bar associations and federal courts 
from enforcing qualifications to practice.71 
C. TENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF BAPCPA’S ATTORNEY REGULATION 
Undoubtedly, lawyers will argue that these 
provisions are unconstitutional in regulating 
attorneys and assuming control over a matter 
traditionally left to the states.  The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in New York v. United States,72 
and Printz v. United States,73 revived the Tenth 
Amendment as a limit on federal power.  
Specifically, they held that Congress may not 
“commandeer” states and coerce the states into 
implementing federal policy.  Thus, the claim will 
be that BAPCPA violates the Tenth Amendment in 
shifting responsibility over this aspect of 
regulating lawyers from states to the federal 
government. 
But the problem with this argument is that the 
Supreme Court has not held that the Tenth 
Amendment reserves a zone of activities for 
exclusive state control.  Rather, the Tenth 
Amendment decisions of the last fifteen years have 
had a narrower focus: they establish that Congress 
cannot compel state legislative or regulatory 
activity.  In New York v. United States, the Court 
declared unconstitutional a federal law requiring 
that state governments clean up their nuclear 
wastes.  The Court explained that Congress was 
commandeering the states and forcing them to adopt 
laws and regulations.  In Printz v. United States, 
the Court held unconstitutional a provision of the 
Brady Handgun Control Act that required state and 
local law enforcement personnel to do background 
checks before issuing permits for firearms.  
 
70Code § 526(c)(5). 
71Code § 526(d). 
72505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
73521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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Again, the Court found that Congress was 
impermissibly coercing states into enforcing a 
federal mandate. 
A challenge to BAPCPA on Tenth Amendment grounds 
must, under these decisions, show that the federal 
government is compelling states to enact laws or 
regulations or implement a federal mandate.  It is 
not enough to argue that regulating lawyers is a 
traditional responsibility of state governments.  
The federal government’s assumption of functions 
traditionally performed by the states is not a 
violation of the Tenth Amendment under any of the 
recent Supreme Court decisions.  Moreover, it must 
be remembered that federal courts long have 
regulated the conduct of attorneys who appear 
before them. 
Nor is the separation of powers argument likely 
to succeed.  State legislatures long have 
regulated attorney conduct; there is no reason why 
Congress cannot do so in federal courts.  
Bankruptcy courts are created by Congress and it 
is difficult to see why they cannot regulate who 
is eligible to practice there and how they must 
behave so long as Congress is not preventing 
bankruptcy courts, as adjuncts of federal district 
courts, from carrying out their judicial 
functions. 
 
IV.  WHETHER THE INVOLUNTARY CHAPTER 11 
PLAN REQUIRING FIVE YEARS OF PAYMENTS 
VIOLATES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Although a principal purpose of BAPCPA is to 
cause more debtors to file Chapter 13 cases, it 
does so solely by imposing new limits on the 
filing of Chapter 7 cases while leaving the filing 
of a Chapter 13 case purely voluntary.  BAPCPA 
does not permit the filing of an involuntary 
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Chapter 13 case.74 
But BAPCPA for the first time makes all of an 
individual Chapter 11 debtor’s postpetition 
earnings property of the estate.75  And it 
requires, upon objection by an unsecured creditor, 
that all of the debtor’s projected disposable 
income be devoted to the plan for five years 
unless all unsecured claims are paid in full.76  
Because an involuntary individual Chapter 11 case 
remains permissible except against a family 
farmer,77 the required devotion of five years’ 
disposable earnings to a Chapter 11 plan may raise 
Thirteenth Amendment peonage issues. 
A. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PEONAGE 
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and 
involuntary servitude.  In 1867, Congress 
abolished peonage, declared state laws sanctioning 
it void, and made it a crime to hold anyone in “a 
condition of peonage.”78  In sustaining and 
enforcing these constitutional enactments, the 
Supreme Court defined peonage as:  
a status or condition of compulsory 
service based upon the indebtedness of 
the peon to the master.  The basal fact 
is indebtedness . . . [whether] the 
debtor voluntarily contracts to enter 
the service of his creditor . . . [or 
the servitude] is forced upon the 
debtor by some provision of law. . . . 
[P]eonage, however created, is 
compulsory service, involuntary 
 
74Code § 303(a), which provides that an “involuntary case may be 
commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title,” remains 
unchanged by BAPCPA. 
75Code § 1115. 
76Code § 1129(a)(15). 
77Code § 303(a), unchanged by BAPCPA. 
7814 Stat. 546 (1967) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981) & U.S.C. § 1994 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).  For a history of 
peonage statutes, see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7-13 (1944). 
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servitude.79 
In addition, there must also be compulsory 
service so that, for example, a taxpayer’s 
allegation that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
officer demanded repayment of a nonexistent tax 
debt and levied on the taxpayer’s property to 
collect the debt is not “peonage” where the 
taxpayer failed to allege that the officer held 
him against his will or forced him to perform 
labor to satisfy the debt.80  The “essence [of 
peonage] is compulsory service in payment of a 
debt.  A peon is one who is compelled to work for 
his creditor until his debt is paid.”81  Peonage is 
a form of involuntary servitude.82 
Several courts have contended that the 
elimination of peonage was one of the goals of the 
Thirteenth Amendment,83 and the Amendment has 
 
79Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); See also Bailey 
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (distinguished by Wilson v. State, 
138 Ga. 489, 75 S.E. 619 (1912) and by State v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 
190 Ala. 409, 67 So. 286 (1914)).  Under the peonage system a laborer 
is absolutely bound to his employer.  He is absolutely compelled to 
stay and labor until he has paid his indebtedness.  If he attempts to 
leave, or leaves, he can be restrained or forced to return.  The 
employer can sell his unexpired term to anyone who will pay the 
amount due and assume the obligations of the master.  State v. 
Murray, 116 La. 655, 40 So. 930 (1906) (overruled in part on other 
grounds by State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 80 So. 195 (1918)).  Peonage 
is involuntary servitude that involves the additional element of 
being tied to the discharge of an indebtedness.  U. S. v. Shackney, 
333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) (distinguished by, U.S. v. Kozminski, 821 
F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987) and disagreement on other grounds 
recognized by Sharp v. State, 245 Kan. 749, 783 P.2d 343 (1989)). 
80Del Elmer v. Metzger, 967 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1997). 
81Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242. 
82Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942).  “Involuntary 
servitude” is the coerced service of one person for another through 
use, or threatened use, of law, physical force, or some other method 
that causes the laborer to believe that the laborer has no 
alternative to performing the service.  Blair v. Checker Cab Co., 558 
N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).  It is an action by a master 
causing a servant to have, or to believe he has, no way to avoid 
continued service or confinement.  Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 
F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 1996). 
83Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional 
Amendment In Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 385, n. 57 
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regularly been invoked in decisions condemning 
peonage.84  In fact, peonage had been forbidden at 
common law by the time the Amendment was 
ratified.85  “The relevance of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to peonage cases, besides providing a 
convenient basis for congressional and judicial 
rulemaking power, is that it provides a standard 
by which to determine the voluntariness of labor 
performed pursuant to a debt.”86 
B. MAY DEBTORS BE COMPELLED TO PAY CREDITORS FROM FUTURE 
WAGES? 
The question whether debtors may be compelled to 
pay creditors from future wages is not a new one, 
although it is central to the new provision of the 
Code.  The issue was raised long before the 
current Code was enacted. 
In 1934, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Local Loan 
Co. v. Hunt,87 had occasion to consider whether a 
bankruptcy debtor’s assignment of future wages 
under state law created a lien that was 
nondischargeable under the federal bankruptcy law.  
Creditors argued that Illinois case law held that 
an assignment of future wages created a lien that 
could not be discharged in bankruptcy.88  Without 
 
(1995) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896)) (“This 
infamous case that sanctioned ‘separate but equal’ accommodations for 
African-Americans counted among the Amendment’s targets ‘Mexican 
peonage [and] the Chinese coolie trade.’”) 
84See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey, 219 
U.S. 219; Clyatt, 197 U.S. 207. 
85Kares, supra note 83, at 385 n.59 (“Debtors’ prisons were already 
a thing of the past when the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, and 
specific performance was not allowed as a remedy for breach of a 
personal service contract.”).  See generally American Broadcasting 
Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981) (discussing courts’ 
longstanding refusal to compel labor in fulfillment of a legal 
obligation). 
86Kares, supra note 83, at 385. 
87292 U.S. 234 (1934). 
88The underlying issue was not whether the lien was dischargeable 
but whether there was a lien on future wages at all.  At the time, 
authorities were split on the question of whether a lien could exist 
prior to the debtor’s acquisition of the property that served as 
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reaching the issue of whether such a lien would 
constitute unconstitutional peonage, the Supreme 
Court held that such state law was so subversive 
of the fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Act 
that it need not be followed by a federal court of 
bankruptcy: 
One of the primary purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Act is to “relieve the 
honest debtor from the weight of 
oppressive indebtedness, and permit him 
to start afresh free from the 
obligations and responsibilities 
consequent upon business 
misfortunes.” . . . 
When a person assigns future wages, he, 
in effect, pledges his future earning 
power.  The power of the individual to 
earn a living for himself and those 
dependent upon him is in the nature of 
a personal liberty quite as much if not 
more than it is a property right.  To 
preserve its free exercise is of the 
utmost importance, not only because it 
is a fundamental private necessity, but 
because it is a matter of great public 
concern.  From the viewpoint of the 
wage-earner there is little difference 
between not earning at all and earning 
wholly for a creditor.  Pauperism may 
be the necessary result of either.  The 
amount of the indebtedness, or the 
proportion of wages assigned, may here 
be small, but the principle, once 
established, will equally apply where 
 
collateral, i.e., a “floating lien.”  That issue was not finally 
resolved until adoption of § 9-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  
See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 n.7 (9th Cir. 
1969).  But in Local Loan v. Hunt, the creditor argued that Illinois 
law recognized the validity of such floating liens, which could 
therefore apply to future wages.  292 U.S. at 243.  The Supreme Court 
did not decide that issue. 
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both are very great.  The new 
opportunity in life and the clear field 
for future effort, which it is the 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to afford 
the emancipated debtor, would be of 
little value to the wage-earner if he 
were obliged to face the necessity of 
devoting the whole or a considerable 
portion of his earnings for an 
indefinite time in the future to the 
payment of indebtedness incurred prior 
to his bankruptcy.  Confining our 
determination to the case in hand, and 
leaving prospective liens upon other 
forms of acquisitions to be dealt with 
as they may arise, we reject the 
Illinois decisions as to the effect of 
an assignment of wages earned after 
bankruptcy as being destructive of the 
purpose and spirit of the Bankruptcy 
Act.89 
Chapter XIII wage earner reorganization was 
formally introduced into the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 by the 1938 amendments effected by the 
Chandler Act.90  It was purely voluntary, and no 
provision of the Bankruptcy Act would disqualify 
an individual debtor for “straight” bankruptcy 
relief (the equivalent of the Code’s Chapter 7) 
simply because the debtor could qualify for 
Chapter XIII relief.  Nonetheless, in some 
communities where Chapter XIII relief was used 
extensively, “referees are not only hospitable, 
but counsel and the credit community generally 
encourage, if indeed they do not insist, that 
wage-earner debtors in financial distress petition 
for relief under Chapter XIII.”91 
 
89Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244-45 (citations omitted). 
9052 Stat. 840 (June 22, 1938). 
91REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part I 
at 158, H. Doc. 93-137, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973) (hereafter “1970 
Commission Report”). 
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During the 90th Congress in 1967 an attempt was 
made, but shot down, to deny straight bankruptcy 
relief for any debtor who would qualify for a 
Chapter XIII case.92  Several arguments were made 
against the proposal, including the contention 
that forcing an individual to work for creditors 
would likely violate the Thirteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, which prohibits 
involuntary servitude.93  In addition, lawmakers 
believed that an involuntary wage-earner plan was 
unworkable since “an unwilling debtor is less 
likely to retain his job or to cooperate in the 
repayment plan, and more often than not, the plan 
would be pre-ordained to fail.”94 
The 1970 Bankruptcy Commission also considered 
and rejected the notion of requiring consumer 
debtors to devote future income to debt 
satisfaction as a condition of obtaining relief in 
bankruptcy.95 
The resilient efforts of creditor lobbyists in 
this regard96 yielded some success in 1984 when 
 
92See Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967). 
93“To force unwilling wage earners to devote their future earnings 
to payment of past debts smacked to some of debt peonage, 
particularly when business debtors could not be subjected to the same 
kind of regimen under the Bankruptcy Act.”  1970 Commission Report, 
supra note 91, at 159. 
94H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 120 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6081. 
95The Commission has considered the arguments made for 
conditioning the availability of bankruptcy relief, 
including discharge, on a showing by the debtor that 
he cannot obtain adequate relief from his condition of 
financial distress by proposing a plan for payment of 
his debts out of his future earnings.  The Commission 
has concluded that forced participation by a debtor in 
a plan requiring contributions out of future income 
has so little prospect for success that it should not 
be adopted as a feature of the bankruptcy system.   
1970 Commission Report, supra note 91, at 159. 
96“The credit industry has sought means testing consistently for at 
least 30 years, but Congress has consistently refused to change the 
basic structure of the consumer bankruptcy laws.”  REPORT OF THE NAT’L 
BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N. 90-91 (October 1997) (hereafter “1997 Commission 
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Congress added § 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code, 
authorizing a court to dismiss a case filed by an 
individual with primarily consumer debts if 
granting relief would constitute “a substantial 
abuse” of the provisions of Chapter 7 of the 
Code.97  This section has been widely interpreted 
by bankruptcy judges to provide for the dismissal 
of a consumer debtor’s Chapter 7 case when the 
debtor has the financial ability to make 
meaningful repayments to creditors.98 
The 1997 Commission Report considered numerous 
proposals for “means testing” and other methods to 
compel or encourage debtors to file Chapter 13 
cases rather than Chapter 7.  After “intensive 
review,” the Commission concluded that “[a]ccess 
to Chapter 7 and to Chapter 13, the central 
feature of the consumer bankruptcy system for 
nearly 60 years, should be preserved.”99  The 1997 
Commission Report did not address the peonage 
issue, either with respect to means testing for 
Chapter 7 or involuntary Chapter 11 cases.100 
Several commentators have considered whether the 
ordering of a divorced spouse to pay for the 
future living expenses of the other by way of 
alimony constituted peonage or involuntary 
 
Report”). 
97See Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 § 312, 98 
Stat. 355. 
98E.g., Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 
1988) (“[W]e hold that the debtor’s ability to pay his debts when 
due, as determined by his ability to fund a chapter 13 plan, is the 
primary factor to be considered in determining whether granting 
relief would be a substantial abuse.”). 
991997 Commission Report, supra note 96, at 91. 
100Two Commissioners filed a dissent that objected that the majority 
in support of the Commission Report was only 5-4, proposed various 
“means test” limits on the availability of Chapter 7 relief, and 
“dismissed this odd notion” that compulsory payment of debts out of 
future wages might constitute unconstitutional peonage by an 
extensive quotation from In re Higginbotham, 111 B.R. 955, 966-67 
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).  Edith H. Jones and James I. Shepard, 
Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform of Consumer 
Bankruptcy Law 3, 16-23, 1997 Commission Report, supra note 96. 
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servitude.101  This seems the closest analogue to 
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  The 
Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to directly 
address this issue.102  But the practice of 
requiring alimony, which necessitates employment, 
occurs all over the country on a regular basis. 
But the argument is not a frivolous one.  Courts 
have held that forced labor, with the threat of a 
criminal punishment is peonage and violates the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  This also applies to labor 
forced after receiving an advance payment.103  The 
Court’s rationale in Bailey v. Alabama was that 
“the state could not avail itself of the sanction 
of the criminal law to supply the compulsion (to 
enforce labor) any more than it could use or 
authorize the use of physical force.”104  One state 
supreme court said of alimony: “[T]he question 
facing the Court is whether a judicially imposed 
system of involuntary servitude is to be continued 
wherein one human being is placed in bondage to 
another for what is effectively the remainder of 
his natural life.”105 
C. BAPCPA’S CHAPTER 11 PLAN REQUIREMENT FOR FIVE YEARS’ 
WAGES 
Although BAPCPA has no direct effect on the 
eligibility of individual debtors to file Chapter 
11 cases,106 the new means test for filing a 
 
101See e.g., Alfred J. Sciarrino & Susan K. Duke, Alimony: Peonage 
or Involuntary Servitude?, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 67 (2003). 
102“It appears that in most instances the right case has not 
presented itself, as appellants who might have been aggrieved have 
generally voluntarily settled for a specific maintenance amount, 
thereby failing to trigger Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude 
restrictions.”  Id. at 94. 
103Id. at 74. 
104Id. at 74-75 (citing Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244 (1911) 
and United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988)). 
105Olsen v. Olsen, 557 P.2d 604, 606 (1976) (Shepard, J., 
dissenting). 
106Code § 109(d), unchanged by BAPCPA. 
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Chapter 7 case107 coupled with the unchanged 
eligibility requirements for Chapter 13108 may 
result in many more individual Chapter 11 cases 
being filed.  But Chapter 11 has been 
significantly changed for individual debtors. 
New Code § 1115 provides that for an individual 
debtor, property of the estate includes, in 
addition to all of the property identified in § 
541: (1) all property of the kind described in § 
541 that the debtor acquires after commencement of 
the case and before the case is closed, dismissed 
or converted, and (2) earnings from services 
performed by the debtor after commencement of the 
case and before the case is closed, dismissed or 
converted.  New Code § 1141(d)(5) provides that 
absent a hardship discharge,109 an individual 
Chapter 11 debtor shall not receive a discharge 
until “completion of all payments under the plan.”  
Because the property acquired postpetition and the 
earnings from postpetition services are property 
of the estate until the case is closed, and 
because the discharge will not be granted until 
completion of all plan payments, all postpetition 
earnings will continue to be property of the 
estate for the duration of the plan. 
New § 1129(a)(15) requires that, unless 
unsecured creditors are paid in full or do not 
object, the value of property to be distributed 
 
107Code § 707(b), substantially amended by BAPCPA. 
108Code § 109(d), unchanged by BAPCPA, limits Chapter 13 to 
individuals with regular income whose noncontingent, liquidated 
unsecured and secured debts do not exceed $307,673 and $922,975, 
respectively, subject to consumer price adjustments every three 
years. 
109Code § 1141(d)(5)(B) provides that the court may grant a 
discharge prior to completion of all plan payments if the value of 
property actually distributed under the plan is not less than the 
amount that would have been available for distribution if the debtor 
had been liquidated under Chapter 7, and modification of the plan is 
not practicable.  The provision does not identify this as a hardship 
discharge nor require the debtor to prove that the failure to make 
plan payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not 
be held accountable, as does the comparable provision for Chapter 13 
cases, § 1328(b)(1). 
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under the plan must at least equal the debtor’s 
projected disposable income (as defined in § 
1325(b)(2)) to be received during the five-year 
period beginning on the date that the first 
payment is due under the plan or during the plan’s 
term, whichever is longer. 
And two new provisions increase the possibility 
of creditors’ plans.  New Code § 1121(d)(2) 
provides that the debtor’s exclusive right to file 
a plan may not be extended beyond eighteen months 
after the filing of the case.  And even if an 
individual debtor’s plan is confirmed and 
substantially consummated, new Code § 1127(e) 
permits an unsecured creditor or the U.S. Trustee 
to seek modification of the plan to change the 
amount of payments or to extend or reduce the time 
period for payments under the plan. 
As the essence of peonage is compulsory service 
in payment of a debt,110 it is certain that it will 
be argued that an involuntary individual Chapter 
11 case coupled with the commitment of five years’ 
disposable income to the plan constitutes 
impermissible peonage.  A debtor in this instance 
seems to be compelled to work for five years after 
having pledged his future earnings to his 
creditors.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court will 
have to decide the issue that it has avoided in 
the alimony context as to the meaning of peonage. 
However, there may be an important distinction 
between an involuntary Chapter 11 case and 
alimony.  The sanction for failure to make alimony 
or child support payments may include contempt and 
jail.111  But the failure to make Chapter 11 plan 
payments would result only in denial of the 
discharge and dismissal of the case.  Perhaps the 
payments could be compelled by a wage assignment, 
but there is no sanction other than loss of the 
 
110Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911). 
111See, e.g., Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles (In re Gruntz), 202 
F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (360-day jail sentence for failing to 
pay child support). 
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discharge if the debtor quits the job. 
The peonage challenge to involuntary Chapter 11 
proceedings will present a fascinating issue to 
the bankruptcy courts and ultimately to the 
Supreme Court.  But it has to be remembered that 
rarely have the courts found practices to be 
unconstitutional peonage in violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  The challenge is made 
especially difficult because there is no 
possibility of contempt or imprisonment for those 
who fail to make the required payments. 
 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE MEANS 
TEST 
A. THE MEANS TEST 
America is a country that believes in second 
chances.112  Consistent with this belief, 
bankruptcy laws historically have been used to 
give financially beleaguered debtors a second 
chance, a clean economic slate.113  Whether, and 
when, this second chance continues to be warranted 
has been the subject of intense debate for the 
past several years.  Under intense pressure by 
well-funded creditor lobbying groups,114 Congress 
 
112A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the 
Means?, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 243 (2001). 
113Id. 
114Id. (citing Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays 
Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001; Christopher H. Schmitt, Tougher 
Bankruptcy Laws - Compliments of MBNA?, BUS. WK., Feb. 26, 2001, at 
43; Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, Big Money and Politics/Who 
Gets Hurt, TIME, May 15, 2000 at 64 (reporting lobbying costs of more 
than $ 5 million); Editorial, Bad Ideas on Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Feb. 
18, 2000, at A22 (noting that bankruptcy is in “the spotlight” due to 
“some pricey lobbying by financial firms”); Russ Feingold, Lobbyists’ 
Rush for Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POST., June 7, 1999, at A19 (“Credit 
card companies have spent tens of millions of dollars to push a bill 
that legal experts and judges say won’t work.”); Dan Morgan, 
Creditors’ Money Talks Louder in Bankruptcy Debate: Consumer Groups 
Fight New Curbs on Insolvent Debtors, WASH. POST, Jun. 1, 1999 at A04 
(reporting critics’ concern that the drive to overhaul bankruptcy 
laws presents “a case study of the impact of money on the political 
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has considered and eventually enacted legislation 
that imposes a “means test” for bankruptcy relief.  
Making potential debtors satisfy a means test, 
critics argue, will ensure that bankruptcy relief 
is available only to people who can document a 
quantifiable need for this economic relief. 
Under the new means test contained in Code § 
707(b), an “abuse” of the bankruptcy law is 
presumed if the amount of the debtor’s income 
remaining after deduction of certain expenses and 
other specified amounts exceeds the specified 
thresholds.  Unless the debtor could demonstrate 
“special circumstances” that cause the expected 
disposable income to fall below the threshold, the 
Chapter 7 case would be dismissed or converted to 
a Chapter 13 or Chapter 11 case.115 
Application of the means test will vary to some 
extent throughout the nation.  The “safe harbor” 
hinges on the median family income for the state 
of the debtor’s residence,116 and therefore 
application of the means test will vary 
significantly from state to state.  When the means 
test does apply, the expenses that are deducted 
from the debtor’s income are not the debtor’s 
actual expenses but rather are amounts established 
by the IRS based on family size.117  Many of the 
expense categories, such as transportation, are 
uniform throughout the nation,118 while housing 
expenses vary greatly depending on location.  The 
housing expense deduction will not even be uniform 
throughout a state, because it is governed by the 
 
process”); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge, 
Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Harder Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at 
A1 (reporting that credit trade group held a $1000-a-head fundraiser 
for a chief proponent of bankruptcy reform). 
115For a more detailed analysis of the means test, see Sommer, supra 
note 43, at 193-203. 
116Id. at 195. 
117Id. at 197. 
118Id. at 198 (noting that the National Standards for transportation 
fail to “take into account large disparities in car insurance costs 
that exist within some metropolitan areas”). 
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county where the debtor resides.119 
Eligibility for Chapter 7 relief will now vary 
depending on the state and county where the debtor 
resides.  This lack of uniformity raises the 
question whether the means test violates the 
constitutional requirement that bankruptcy laws be 
“uniform.” 
B. WHETHER THE MEANS TEST VIOLATES THE BANKRUPTCY UNIFORMITY 
CLAUSE 
The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution grants 
Congress the power “to establish . . . uniform 
laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the 
United States.”120  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this uniformity language in several 
contexts.  Chief Justice Marshall observed in the 
first interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause that 
“[t]he peculiar terms of the grant [of bankruptcy 
power] certainly deserve notice” because “Congress 
is not authorized merely to pass laws, the 
operation of which shall be uniform, but to 
establish uniform laws on the subject throughout 
the United States.”121 
The only element distinguishing the Bankruptcy 
Clause from the other Article I powers is the 
concept of “uniformity”: Congress is granted the 
power “to establish . . . uniform laws on the 
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”122  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the uniformity provision was 
intended to authorize a national law enforceable 
in whatever state the debtor might be found, as 
well as to prohibit private bankruptcy laws 
benefiting individual debtors.123  In addition, 
“[t]he uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy 
 
119Id. at 198. 
120U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
121Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193-94 (1819). 
122U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
123Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471-72 
(1982). 
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Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for 
bankrupts.”124  Just as “the uniformity requirement 
is not a straitjacket that forbids Congress to 
distinguish among classes of debtors,” there is no 
reason to suppose that uniformity requires that 
all creditors must be identically subject to 
suit.125 
“‘Uniformity’ is problematic in the bankruptcy 
context because: (i) most laws governing the 
substance of relationships between debtor and 
creditors are state laws; (ii) these state laws 
are incorporated into and applied in the federal 
Bankruptcy Code; and (iii) these state laws are 
not necessarily uniform.”126  Since debtors and 
creditors in similar factual situations will often 
receive different treatment in bankruptcy from 
state to state, one might conclude that 
constitutional uniformity is not achieved by the 
bankruptcy law.  This type of uniformity (or lack 
thereof) has been described by the Supreme Court 
as “personal” uniformity.127  For example, a debtor 
in California might be liable in bankruptcy on a 
claim for breach of a cohabitation agreement, 
while a Vermont debtor might not be liable on such 
a claim on identical facts.  A debtor in Florida 
may be able to exempt a palatial homestead, while 
a Pennsylvania debtor may be entitled to almost no 
homestead exemption.128 
According to Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, a 
landmark 1902 Supreme Court decision, all the 
Constitution requires is “geographical” 
uniformity, rather than personal uniformity.129  In 
Moyses, the Court upheld the incorporation of 
 
124Id. at 471 n.11. 
125Id. at 469. 
126Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States, 3 AM. BANKR INST. L. REV. 5, 46 (1995). 
127Id. (citing Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 
(1902)). 
128Id. 
129Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188-90. 
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state exemption laws in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.  
Geographical uniformity in this context, the Court 
observed, was satisfied “when the trustee takes in 
each state whatever would have been available to 
the creditor if the bankruptcy law had not been 
passed.”130  The purpose of the Uniformity Clause 
and its requirement of strict geographic 
uniformity was to prevent discrimination by 
Congress among the states.131 
Thus, a bankruptcy law is “uniform” when (i) the 
substantive law applied in a bankruptcy case 
conforms to that applied outside of bankruptcy 
under state law; (ii) the same law is applied to 
all debtors within a state and to their creditors; 
and (iii) Congress uniformly delegates to the 
states the power to fix those laws.  The fact that 
debtors and creditors in different states may 
receive different treatment does not render the 
law unconstitutional.132 
In 1918, the Court reaffirmed the Moyses 
principle in a case involving the use of state 
fraudulent conveyance laws in bankruptcy.133  More 
recently, lower courts have followed Moyses in 
upholding the exemption provisions of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code against uniformity challenges.134  
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.  
Still, the Supreme Court continues to support the 
proposition that “the uniformity requirement is 
not a straitjacket that forbids Congress to 
distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it 
prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws 
do not treat commercial transactions in a uniform 
manner.”135 
A uniformity issue is also presented when 
 
130Id. at 190. 
131Tabb, supra note 126, at 46-47; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901). 
132Tabb, supra note 126, at 47. 
133Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). 
134See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982). 
135Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982). 
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Congress passes a bankruptcy law that is not 
available to all debtors across the country.  The 
Court has ruled that private bankruptcy laws for 
particular debtors are not permitted.  In recent 
years the Supreme Court has twice confronted this 
problem with regard to special railroad 
legislation.  In Blanchette v. Connecticut General 
Insurance Corp. (The Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act Cases),136 the Court upheld the Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act although the law was restricted 
in its application to the railroads of a single 
geographic region.  The saving grace in the law 
stemmed from the reality that all of the railroads 
then operating under the bankruptcy laws were in 
that region; even if the statute had been drafted 
to be of general applicability, its operation and 
effect would have been unchanged.137  “The 
uniformity provision does not deny Congress power 
to take into account differences that exist 
between different parts of the country, and to 
fashion legislation to resolve geographically 
isolated problems.”138  The Court explained that 
“[t]he problem dealt with (under the Bankruptcy 
Clause) may present significant variations in 
different parts of the country.”139  According to 
the Court in Railway Labor Executives’ Association 
v. Gibbons,140 however, Congress did overreach its 
authority in passing a private bankruptcy law that 
affected only the employees of the Rock Island 
Railroad.141 
In conclusion, a bankruptcy law may be “uniform” 
even though it incorporates state law so that 
there are different results in different States.142  
 
136419 U.S. 102 (1974). 
137Tabb, supra note 126, at 46. 
138Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 159. 
139Id. (citing Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440, 463 n.7 
(1937)). 
140455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
141Id. at 470-71. 
142Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982); 
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918); Hanover Nat’l Bank v. 
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In order to show that the means test violates the 
“uniformity” requirement, it would be necessary to 
demonstrate how it is violative of “geographic” 
uniformity, as opposed to “personal” uniformity. 
Perhaps the strongest argument that can be made 
against the means test is that its lack of 
uniformity within a state—due to the housing 
expense that varies by county—violates the Moyses 
holding that arguably requires uniform application 
within each state.  Since the Supreme Court 
already has held that a bankruptcy law may be 
uniform even though it incorporates state law and 
leads to varying results in different states, it 
will be difficult to challenge the means test on 
uniformity grounds. 
C. WHETHER THE MEANS TEST VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION 
PRINCIPLES 
In addition, the uniformity provision does not 
forbid Congress to distinguish between different 
classes of debtors, different industries, or 
different creditors.143  Certain entities, such as 
insurance companies and most banks, are not 
permitted to file for bankruptcy protection.144  
There are special chapters for family farmers145 
and municipalities,146 and railroads are not 
permitted to file under Chapter 7 but may file 
under Chapter 11.147 
However, the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which is applied to the 
federal government through the Fifth Amendment, 
 
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902) (bankruptcy trustee may “uniformly” 
take whatever property is available to creditors under relevant state 
law, even though this may have vastly different results in different 
states). 
143Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 469 (“The uniformity requirement of the 
Bankruptcy Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for bankrupts.”  
Id. at 471 n.11). 
144Code § 109(b)(2). 
145Code §§ 1201 et seq. 
146Code §§ 901 et seq. 
147Code § 109(b)(1) and (d). 
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provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” 148  This provision forbids 
the government from treating individuals in like 
situations differently, which might be the case 
under the means test where two individuals with 
exactly the same income receive different 
treatment depending upon the state or county of 
their residence. 
Because bankruptcy legislation is a form of 
economic regulation, only the rational basis test 
is used.  In other words, the law will be upheld 
so long as it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose.  This standard is 
very deferential to the government and rarely have 
any laws been found to fail the rational basis 
test. 
The legislative history of BAPCPA states: 
[The Act is] a comprehensive package of 
reform measures pertaining to both 
consumer and business bankruptcy cases. 
The purpose of the bill is to improve 
bankruptcy law and practice by 
restoring personal responsibility and 
integrity in the bankruptcy system and 
ensure that the system is fair for both 
debtors and creditors. 
With respect to the interests of 
creditors, the proposed reforms respond 
to many of the factors contributing to 
the increase in consumer bankruptcy 
filings, such as lack of personal 
financial accountability, the 
proliferation of serial filings, and 
the absence of effective oversight to 
 
148U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  On its face, this amendment applies 
only to the states; however, the Court has found that the federal 
government, although not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, has the 
same restriction placed upon them by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Therefore, neither the states nor the federal 
government can deny any person equal protection of the laws. 
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eliminate abuse in the system. The 
heart of the bill’s consumer bankruptcy 
reforms consists of the implementation 
of an income/expense screening 
mechanism (“needs-based bankruptcy 
relief” or “means testing”), which is 
intended to ensure that debtors repay 
creditors the maximum they can 
afford.149 
Therefore, in considering equal protection 
challenges to the means test, courts will need to 
consider (1) whether this reflects a legitimate 
interest and (2) whether the means test is 
rationally related to the achievement of this 
goal.150 
 
VI.  WHETHER COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF 
TAX RETURNS VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVACY 
A. WHALEN, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND CONTROL OVER PRIVATE 
INFORMATION 
BAPCPA imposes on debtors many new filing and 
disclosure requirements.  These include § 521(e) & 
(f), which require debtors to file tax returns 
that must be made available to creditors upon 
request.  Do such requirements violate 
constitutional rights of privacy? 
“The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 
‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two 
different kinds of interests.  One is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”151  The new provisions of § 521 
implicate the interest “in avoiding disclosure of 
 
149H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 at (2005) (footnote omitted). 
150See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 
151Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
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personal matters.” 
The right of privacy has evolved to provide some 
protection for the ability of individuals to 
determine what sort of information about 
themselves is collected and how that information 
is used.  But privacy in the sense of freedom to 
withhold personal financial information from the 
government or the public has received little 
constitutional protection.152 
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court extended 
substantive due process privacy protection to 
informational privacy, holding that the “zone of 
privacy” protected by the Constitution encompasses 
the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”153  The Whalen Court considered 
a New York law requiring physicians to disclose 
reports identifying patients receiving 
prescription drugs that have a potential for 
abuse.154  The state maintained a centralized data 
file that listed the names and contact information 
of the patients and the prescribing doctors.  The 
challengers of the law argued that this database 
infringed the right to privacy because individuals 
have a right to avoid disclosure of personal 
matters.155  Although the Court did not explicitly 
reject the idea that the right of privacy might be 
recognized at some point in the future, the 
majority decided that the right was not infringed 
by the New York law. 
Several commentators have observed that if a 
system of debt relief utilizes extensive 
information about the consumer’s financial 
condition to determine if the consumer should 
 
152See, e.g., O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 
1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974) 
(rejecting an elected official’s attack on forced financial 
disclosure).  But cf. California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 
21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea 
v. Young, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225 (1970). 
153429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
154Id. 
155Id. at 598-99. 
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repay her debts, there is a strong argument for 
gathering all of this information only once in a 
proceeding that binds all creditors, thereby 
avoiding duplicative litigation.156  The 
justification is even less compelling in a system 
that sets exemptions of income and assets so large 
that the vast majority of consumers repay 
nothing.157 
B. BAPCPA’S PERSONAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Section 521(a)(1), as amended by BAPCPA, 
requires all debtors to file: (1) copies of all 
payment advices or other evidence of payment, if 
any, from any employer within sixty days preceding 
the bankruptcy filing; (2) a statement of the 
amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how 
such amount is calculated; and (3) a statement 
disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in 
income or expenditures in the twelve-month period 
following the date of filing.158  Failure to file 
all this information within forty-five days of the 
petition may result in automatic dismissal of the 
case effective on the forty-sixth day,159 or 
dismissal within five days of a request by a party 
in interest.160  The only exceptions are that a 
debtor may obtain a forty-five day extension upon 
motion filed within the initial forty-five days,161 
or a trustee may move within the initial forty-
five days for the case not to be dismissed because 
the debtor attempted in good faith to file all the 
required information and the best interests of 
creditors would be served by the administration of 
the case.162 
 
156Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121 
(2004). 
157Id. 
158Sommer, supra note 43, at 212. 
159Code § 521(i)(1). 
160Code § 521(i)(2). 
161Code § 521(i)(3). 
162Code § 521(i)(4). 
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In addition, new § 521(e)(2)(A) requires a 
Chapter 7 or 13 individual debtor to provide the 
trustee, not later than seven days before the date 
first set for the meeting of creditors, a copy of 
his or her federal income tax return or transcript 
(at the election of the debtor) for the latest 
taxable period ending prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy case for which a tax return was 
filed.163  Should the debtor fail to comply with 
this requirement, the case must be dismissed 
unless the debtor demonstrates that such failure 
was due to circumstances beyond the debtor’s 
control.164  Section 521(e)(2)(C) also requires the 
debtor to simultaneously provide a copy of that 
tax return or transcript to any creditor who 
requests it, enforced by the same remedy of 
dismissal unless the debtor demonstrates the 
failure was due to circumstances beyond the 
debtor’s control. 
During the pendency of an individual Chapter 7, 
11, or 13 case, the debtor must file with the 
court, at the request of the judge, United States 
trustee, or any party in interest, at the time 
filed with the taxing authority, copies of any 
federal income tax returns (or transcripts 
thereof) that are required to be filed during the 
pendency of the case.165  In addition, the debtor 
must file copies of any tax returns filed 
postpetition for any tax year within three years 
prepetition.166 
Section 521(g)(2) mandates that the tax returns 
and any amendments be made available to the United 
States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the 
trustee, and any party in interest for inspection 
and copying, subject to procedures to be 
established by the Director of the Administrative 
Office for United States Courts within 180 days 
 
163Sommer, supra note 43, at 213-14. 
164Code § 521(e)(2)(B). 
165Code § 521(f)(1). 
166Code § 521(f)(2). 
793CHEMERINSKYFINAL 9/6/2005  1:57 PM 
200x) DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 143 
from the date of enactment of BAPCPA.  The 
procedures must “safeguard[] the confidentiality 
of any tax information that is required to be 
provided” by § 521, and “shall include 
restrictions on creditor access” to such 
information.167  In addition, the Director must, 
within 540 days from BAPCPA’s enactment date, 
prepare and submit to Congress a report that 
assesses the effectiveness of such procedures and, 
if appropriate, include proposed legislation to 
further protect the confidentiality of such tax 
information and to impose penalties for its 
improper use.168 
The issue will be whether these provisions 
violate the right to informational privacy.  It 
should be noted that regulations are being 
promulgated to address the privacy issue and may 
be crucial as courts assess whether there are any 
privacy problems posed by BAPCPA.  But it does 
seem clear that creditors in a case will be 
entitled to copies of tax returns, even if the 
regulations prohibit the creditors from 
publicizing them further.  Does that compelled 
disclosure itself violate the right of privacy as 
recognized by Whalen?  Although the Supreme Court 
has not yet provided great protection for 
informational privacy, this provision of BAPCPA 
likely will be vulnerable unless regulations are 
adopted to restrict access to such personal 
information.  The broad access to tax information 
accorded to creditors by BAPCPA, without 
meaningful limits or safeguards, provides a strong 
basis for constitutional challenge.  Such a 
challenge might also be made on First Amendment 
grounds if the particular debtor’s tax information 
revealed donations to churches, political groups, 
and charities,169 or income derived from government 
 
167BAPCPA § 315(c)(1) & (2). 
168Id. § 315(c)(3). 
169See, e.g., Heyward C. Hosch III, The Interest in Limiting the 
Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 
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disability payments. 
VII.  WHETHER THE TIME LIMITS FOR 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS VIOLATE THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE AND DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS IN CASES WHERE THEY 
PREVENT A JUDGE FROM GIVING DUE 
DELIBERATION BEFORE RENDERING A 
DECISION, OR WHERE THEY DO NOT GIVE THE 
PARTIES ENOUGH TIME TO COLLECT THEIR 
EVIDENCE AND BRIEF THE COURT BEFORE A 
HEARING MUST COMMENCE (AND A DECISION 
MUST BE ISSUED) 
A. JUDICIAL TIME LIMITS AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES 
Congress has broad power to prescribe 
substantive and procedural rules for the 
judiciary, but separation-of-powers principles 
place important limits on that power when its 
exercise affects the way in which cases are 
decided.170  “Congress clearly has the power to 
affect the process of judicial decision-making in 
many ways.  Courts, for example, must apply valid 
congressional statutes as substantive law in cases 
to which they apply and even give them preference 
 
VAND. L. REV. 139, 151 n.56 (1983) (“In Alabama ex rel. Patterson, [357 
U.S. 449 (1958)], the Court denied effect to a state court order 
compelling disclosure by the NAACP of its membership lists and 
declared that disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in 
controversial advocacy could constitute an effective restraint upon 
the first amendment freedom of association [citation omitted].  The 
Court emphasized that past revelation of NAACP affiliation had 
subjected rank and file members to loss of employment, threats of 
physical harm, and other displays of public hostility.  The Court 
found it foreseeable that disclosure would affect adversely 
petitioners’ ability to pursue their beliefs and would induce some 
members to leave the organization and discourage others from joining 
[citation omitted].”). 
170Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional 
and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995). 
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over many other sources of substantive law with 
which they may conflict.”171  Thus, whenever it 
enacts a substantive statute, Congress controls to 
some extent—and possibly to a dispositive extent—
how courts will decide cases.172 
In addition, a specific proposal to permit 
Congress to regulate the manner in which federal 
courts decide cases was rejected by the 
Constitutional Convention.  By a 6-2 vote, the 
Convention defeated a provision that would have 
provided that, in all cases outside the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction, “the judicial power 
shall be exercised in such manner as the 
Legislature shall direct.”173  The rejection of 
this proposal, which preserved “the otherwise 
constitutionally sacrosanct quality of federal 
judging,”174 supports the principle of decisional 
independence. 
Moreover, Congress may not restrict the role of 
the judiciary in such a way as to deny due process 
of law.  On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court 
explicitly construed statutes narrowly in order to 
avoid preclusion of judicial review altogether.175 
B.  BAPCPA IMPOSES TIME LIMITS FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
BAPCPA amends § 1112(b) to mandate that the 
court convert or dismiss a Chapter 11 case, 
 
171Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of 
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 201 (2001). 
172Id. 
173THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937). 
174James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The 
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III 
Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 754 n.271 (1998). 
175See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, 
Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 
(1993) (noting that the Court considers the underlying substantive 
law when it determines whether there is a constitutional right to 
judicial review); see also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 
828 (1987); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 
(1991); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
793CHEMERINSKYFINAL 9/6/2005  1:57 PM 
146 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. XX 
whichever is in the best interests of creditors 
and the estate, if the movant establishes cause, 
absent unusual circumstances.  In this regard, the 
court must specify the circumstances that support 
the court’s finding that conversion or dismissal 
is not in the best interests of creditors and the 
estate. 
In addition, an exception to the provision’s 
mandatory requirement applies if: (1) the debtor 
or a party in interest objects and establishes 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan 
will be confirmed within the time periods set 
forth in §§ 1121(e) and 1129(e), or if these 
provisions are inapplicable, within a reasonable 
period of time; (2) the grounds for granting such 
relief include an act or omission of the debtor 
for which there exists a reasonable justification 
for such act or omission; and (3) such act or 
omission will be cured within a reasonable period 
of time. 
The court must commence the hearing on a § 
1112(b) motion within thirty days of its filing 
and must decide the motion not later than fifteen 
days after commencement of the hearing unless the 
movant expressly consents to a continuance for a 
specified period of time or compelling 
circumstances prevent the court from meeting these 
time limits.176 
An even tighter time frame is imposed by § 
521(i)(2).  It provides that if a party in 
interest moves for dismissal on account of the 
debtor’s failure to file all documents required by 
§ 521(a)(1) within forty-five days of the 
petition, “the court shall enter an order of 
dismissal not later than 5 days after such 
request.”  While it may be a simple matter of 
judicial notice to determine whether the debtor 
has filed all schedules and statements required by 
§ 521(a)(1), it may require an evidentiary hearing 
 
176Code § 1112(b)(3). 
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to determine whether a debtor has filed all 
payment advices received within sixty days 
prepetition from any employer, as required by § 
521(a)(1)(B)(iv).  This cannot be determined 
simply by the absence of any such payment advices 
in the court’s file, because the debtor may have 
lost the job more than sixty days prepetition, or 
may be paid in cash without any accompanying 
payment advices, and nothing else in the file will 
necessarily reveal those facts.  Because due 
process will undoubtedly require notice to the 
debtor of the setting of such an evidentiary 
hearing, probably by mail, it seems impossible to 
notice the hearing, conduct the hearing and decide 
it within five days of the filing of the 
creditor’s motion. 
The claim will be made that these time limits 
infringe separation of powers.  This, though, will 
be a difficult argument because in other contexts 
the Supreme Court has upheld time limits for 
decisions imposed by Congress on the federal 
courts.  For example, in Miller v. French,177 the 
Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act that requires federal courts 
to rule within thirty days on a government motion 
to end an injunction concerning prison 
conditions.178  If the court does not act within 
thirty days, its earlier injunction must be 
stayed.  The argument was that this provision, 
imposing a strict time limit on the federal 
judiciary, violates separation of powers.  The 
Court rejected the separation of powers challenge, 
but it did declare that there may be a “serious 
question” whether Congress has violated separation 
of powers principles if its rules provide 
insufficient time for fact-finding “before the 
statute invalidates an extant remedial order”: 
If its legislation gives courts 
 
177530 U.S. 327 (2000). 
17818 U.S.C. § 3626. 
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adequate time to determine the 
applicability of a new rule to an old 
order and to take the action necessary 
to apply it or to vacate the order, 
there seems little basis for claiming 
that Congress has crossed the 
constitutional line to interfere with 
the performance of any judicial 
function.  But if determining whether a 
new rule applies requires time (say, 
for new factfinding) and if the statute 
provides insufficient time for a court 
to make that determination before the 
statute invalidates an extant remedial 
order, the application of the statute 
raises a serious question whether 
Congress has in practical terms assumed 
the judicial function.179 
That will be the issue when the time periods 
imposed by BAPCPA are considered. 
Although the Supreme Court has deferred to 
congressionally imposed time limits in other 
contexts, there is a strong basis for challenge if 
it can be shown that the limits imposed by BPCPA 
will prevent bankruptcy courts from providing the 
careful consideration that due process requires.  
In other cases, like Miller v. French, there was 
no claim that the time limits interfered with 
courts performing their judicial duties.  But that 
is exactly the argument that can be made to some 
of the time limits imposed by BAPCPA. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As mentioned at the outset, other constitutional 
issues will undoubtedly arise as BAPCPA is 
implemented and its provisions are litigated.  The 
goal of this Article was merely to highlight some 
of the issues that are likely to arise and to 
 
179Miller, 530 U.S. at 351-52. 
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identify the relevant precedents and analysis for 
these questions.  The only sure conclusion is that 
bankruptcy courts will face more constitutional 
litigation than ever before. 
 
